Abstract. We present a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. The technique, which shares a conceptual origin with the idea of a rank function, uses the notion of a message-template to determine whether a given value is generable by an intruder in a protocol model. Traditionally, the rich algebraic structure of Diffie-Hellman messages has made it difficult to reason about such protocols using formal, rather than complexity-theoretic, techniques. We describe the approach in the context of the MTI A(0) protocol, and derive the conditions under which this protocol can be considered secure.
Introduction
Formal protocol analysis techniques have a simplicity which is due, in part, to the high level of abstraction at which they operate. Such abstractions are justified since any attack discovered at the abstract level will tend to be preserved in a more concrete model. In general, however, failure to discover an attack does not imply correctness, and in seeking to establish correctness we must be mindful of the assumptions on which our abstractions are based.
Protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme [7] present an interesting verification challenge since, in this context, we cannot assume such an abstract view of cryptography. Certain algebraic properties (such as the homomorphism of exponentiation in (g x ) y = (g y ) x ) must be represented for the protocol to reach its functional goal, and other properties (such as the cancellation of multiplicative inverses) must also be considered if we wish to prove a meaningful security result. As a consequence, such protocols have tended to be evaluated in complexity-theoretic models (see [4] , for example) which aim to reduce the correctness of the protocol to some well-defined hard problem, such as the computation of discrete logarithms in a finite field. The resulting proofs tend to be difficult to conduct and evaluate, and a small change in the protocol will often require an entirely new proof to be constructed.
With some exceptions [11, 12, 1] formal techniques have been slow in rising to the challenge of Diffie-Hellman. This paper presents a theorem-proving approach to the verification of a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. Although our r A , r B , r C Random integers, chosen by A, B and C respectively t A ,t B Ephemeral public-keys, t A = g r A , t B = g r B x A , x B , x C Private long-term keys of A, B and C respectively y A , y B Public keys of A and B: y A = g x A , y B = g x B Z AB The shared secret between A and B x ∈ R X An element x chosen at random from the set X
Fig. 1. Protocol notation
approach is quite general we present it in the context of the MTI A(0) protocol of Matsumoto, Takashima and Imai [10] . This protocol is chosen for the simplicity of its messages and non-standard use of Diffie-Hellman (in particular, the computation of a shared key as g x · g y = g x+y ). Some of the MTI protocols satisfy an interesting property -which we call I/O-independence -that enables us to model the protocols at a very abstract level. The protocols and the concept of I/O-independence are described in Section 2. Our model revolves around the idea of a message-template which, suitably instantiated, can represent any value that an intruder can deduce (under a defined set of capabilities).
A particular value remains secret if it cannot be realised via any instantiation of the message-template. This model, and its associated definition of secrecy, is described in Section 3 and applied to the MTI A(0) protocol in Section 4. Although we do not describe it in such language, our approach shares a conceptual origin with the notion of a rank function [13] , and is informed by the approach of Pereira and Quisquater [12] ; we explore these relationships, and conclude, in Section 5.
The MTI protocols
Three infinite classes of authenticated key agreement protocols fall under the banner of MTI [10] . All of the MTI protocols appear amenable to analysis in our framework but, in this paper, we focus on one particular protocol, A(0). The protocol combines long-term and ephemeral key contributions to provide authentication in the Diffie-Hellman scheme. A summary of notation, following [3] , is given in Figure 1 . In protocol A(0) (Figure 2) We say that a protocol is I/O-independent if every honest principal is I/Oindependent.
Proposition 1. Protocol A(0) is I/O-independent.
We will see in the next section that the property of I/O-independence enables us to model protocols at a very abstract level.
A model for I/O-independent Diffie-Hellman protocols
In this section we present a model for I/O-independent protocols based around the idea of a message-template which defines the general form of any message generable by an intruder in a given protocol.
We begin by noting that transmitted messages are elements of some group G in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to be hard. A generator g of G is agreed by all principals and there exists an identity element 1 such that 1 · x = 1, for all x ∈ G. We assume that elements of G can be expressed as g raised to the power of a sum of products of random numbers. This assumption permits, for example, g xy+z , where x, y and z are random numbers, but excludes values such as g (g x ) since the exponent is itself a group element. The users of the system therefore manipulate two types of element, (i) random exponents, and (ii) powers of g, and we assume that only the latter will be sent on the network.
The intruder
We divide the users of the system into a set of honest principals, {A, B}, who will always adhere to the protocol, and a malevolent intruder, C, whose goal is to subvert the protocol.
Some elements of (i) (from above) will be known initially to the intruder (such as random numbers he has chosen himself), and some elements of (ii) will become known to the intruder during the course of the protocol. The I/Oindependent nature of the protocols means that an active intruder cannot influence any of the values sent by honest participants, since the functions which produce these values are not dependent on any external input. This is important, since it is then sufficient to assume that the intruder knows these values from the start.
Following [12] , we divide the intruder's initial knowledge into a set E of exponents and a set P of known powers of g, where x ∈ P indicates knowledge of g x but not of x (unless x ∈ E). We then define the computations that the intruder can perform Definition 2 (intruder capabilities). Given a set P of initially known powers of g and a set E of initially known exponents, the intruder can grow P based on the following operations: 1. given m 1 ∈ P and m 2 ∈ P add m 1 + m 2 to P 2. given m ∈ P and n ∈ E add mn, m(n −1 ) to P 3. given m ∈ P add −m to P In other words, we allow the intruder to (1) compute g m 1 · g m 1 = g m 1 +m 2 given knowledge of g m 1 and g m 2 , (2) compute the exponentiations (g m ) n , (g m ) n −1 given knowledge of g m and n, and (3) compute the inverse 1 g m = g −m given g m . Moreover, these capabilities can be combined: Example 1. Suppose that P = {1, r A } and E = {r C }. The intruder can deduce (i) −r A ∈ P by rule 3 from r A , (ii) 1r C ∈ P by rule 2 and −r A + 1r C ∈ P by rule 1 from (i) and (ii), representing the computation of g r C −r A .
Crucially, the intruder is not able to use m 1 ∈ P and m 2 ∈ P to deduce m 1 m 2 .
In this model, the intruder's entire knowledge can be defined as the closure of P under the deductions of Definition 2 and set E. In any useful protocol, E and P will initially be non-empty, and the resulting knowledge sets will be infinite. For this reason, it will be infeasible to enumerate these sets by growing P via successive application of rules 1-3.
System definition
An examination of the sorts of values that can be deduced by an intruder leads to the following observation: a generable value can be written as some number of elements of P multiplied by some product of (possibly inverted) elements from E. For instance, the value derived in Example 1 can be written as −1(r A )(r 0 C ) + 1(1)(r 1 C ) (noting the difference between the group identity 1 and the integer 1). In fact, we can go further by defining a polynomial over the variables of E and P which represents any value generable by the intruder using rules 1-3, above.
Definition 3. Let F be a finite family of functions that map elements of E to integer powers: F
Given E = {x C }, for example, we may define F = {{x C → −1}}.
Definition 4. Let h be a higher-order function which, for a member of F, maps elements of P to integers:h : F → (P → Z).
As an example, given P = {r A } and F = {{x C → −1}}, we might choose to define h({x C → −1}) = {r A → 1}.
Definition 5 (message-template).
Fix some E and P. Then:
We call v the message-template for a system defined by E and P. Intuition is little help here, so consider a simple example: Example 2. Given the system defined by P = {r A } and E = {x C }, consider how the value g −r A x −1 C +5r A x C can be expressed. P and E result in the following polynomial:
To express a particular generable value we must define F and h. Recall that F is a family of functions. Suppose that F = {{x C → −1}, {x C → 0}, {x C → 1}}, then we have:
As a more complex example, consider the following:
In this polynomial, the value g r C −r A from Example 1 can be represented by defining:
and h such that:
As stated, our intention is that, for a given system (defined by E and P), the polynomial v(F, h) expresses the general form of all values deducible by an intruder, from P and E, by appeal to the deduction rules of Definition 2. We embed the ability of a polynomial to take a certain value in the concept of realisability:
Definition 6. A value m is realisable (written realisable(m)) if there exists functions F and h such that v(F, h) = m.
That is, a value m is realisable if there exists a solution to the equation v(F, h) − m = 0. If m is not realisable we write ¬realisable(m). Define Pub to be a closure containing all possible polynomials for a given system. Pub is the set containing all realisable values of that system: the set of public messages.
Theorem 1 (Faithfulness). Fix some P and E and Pub as defined above. Pub is closed under the deductions of Definition 2.
Proof. By induction. For the base case we show that, whenever p ∈ P, p is realisable.
Base case: Given some p ∈ P, p is realisable with v(F, h) by defining
and:
Inductive step: There are three cases, corresponding to the three intruder deduction rules:
(ii) For the first conjunct assume m 1 = v(F 1 , h 1 ) and n ∈ E. Then, m 1 n is realisable with v(F 2 , h 2 ) by defining:
and h 2 such that:
The second conjunct follows the above, with addition in place of the subtraction in the definition of h 2 .
(iii) Assume
Our intention is for the model to respect the fact that some values are impossible for an intruder to guess. We achieve this by assuming that the variables (r A , x C etc.) are symbolic, that each is distinct from all others, and that the set of variables is disjoint from the set of integers.
The following example makes clear why this restriction is necessary:
Example 4. Consider the system defined by P = {1} andE = {x C }. If variables are numbers, then any group value g X can be realised by defining X = v(F, h), where F = {{x C → 0}} and h({x C → 0}) = {1 → X}, yielding v(F, h) = (1 · X)x 0 C = X. Assumption 1 means that, for the group identity 1, we have that 1 / ∈ Z and, in particular, 1 = 1. However, we grant special privileges to the group identity such that 1 · m = m, for all m. Note that an element n ∈ E \ P will typically only be realisable if 1 ∈ P. That is, n is realisable by v (F, h) , where F = {{n → 1}} and h({n → 1}) = {1 → 1}, giving 1 · (1 · n 1 ) = n.
We require that the above condition be true of any protocol model. To see why this is necessary consider the system given by E = {x C }, P = {1, x C }.
The value x C can be realised in two ways,
, and h 1 , h 2 are defined such that:
, the example allows the same value to be derived in two separate ways.
Secrecy
In a Diffie-Hellman protocol, a principal u performs some key computation function on an input z to derive a secret Z uv believed to be shared with v. We denote this function k uv with Z uv = k uv (z).
Example 5.
In the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol [7] , a principal A, apparently running with B and using the ephemeral secret x A performs the key computation k AB (z) = zx A representing the shared secret Z AB = g zx A .
Definition 7 (Secrecy). Given a system defined by E and P, a key computation function k maintains secrecy iff:

∀m.realisable(m) =⇒ ¬realisable(k(m))
Intuitively, secrecy is defined as an anti-closure property of the set of generable values: the result of applying k to a realisable value should never result in a realisable value. If this property does not hold then an intruder will possess two values, x and y, such that, if x is sent to some principal she will compute y, wrongly believing it to be secret.
Reasoning about the MTI A(0) protocol
A complete model of an I/O-independent protocol is a combination of the messagetemplate with an appropriate key computation function. In this section we present a model of the MTI A(0) protocol and use it to deduce the conditions under which the protocol guarantees the secrecy of a shared key.
Define E A(0) = {r C , x C }, P A(0) = {1, r A , r B , x A , x B }, representing a run of the MTI A(0) protocol. We wish to show that the key computation function k A (0) ab (z) = zx a + x b r a maintains secrecy. There are eight cases to consider:
We treat each in turn.
Cases 1-4
Let a = A and b = C. We are trying to show that, for any z where realisable(z), ¬realisable(k AC (z) = zx A + x C r A is a linear combination, and that the linear combination will be realisable if each of its components is realisable. In general zx A will be realisable if z does not mention x A (since x A ∈ P but x A / ∈ E). Consider, then, z = r C , given by v(F 1 , h 1 ) where:
Similarly, x C r A is realisable by v(F 3 , h 4 ), where:
Theorem 1 then tells us that, since realisable(r C x A ) and realisable(x C r A ), the sum r C x A + x C r A is also realisable, and is given by v(F 2 , h 2 ), where:
From this we conclude that the intruder can deduce a pair of values, r C and r C x A + x C r A , related by the key computation function k A(0) AC , and so secrecy fails. This failure should come as no surprise since b = C represents the intruder's legitimate participation in the protocol. Any honest principal who willingly engages in a protocol run with the intruder cannot hope to maintain secrecy of the resulting session-key. We note that similar conclusions can be reached in cases 2-4.
Cases 5 and 6 (b = a)
Let a = A, b = A. The corresponding key computation is given by k
Note that x A r A is the multiplication of two elements from P. The intruder model only allows the addition of elements from P and, since x A / ∈ E and r A / ∈ E, the component x A r A is unrealisable. Consequently, for zx A + x A r A to be realisable, zx A must be a linear combination that includes −x A r A (since −x A r A + x A r A = 0 is realisable). Consider the simplest case, where z = −r A , which is realisable, since r A ∈ P. The result of k
, where, for instance:
As a result, the intruder can deduce a pair of values −r A and 0 such that 0 = k
AA (−r A ) and, again, secrecy fails. A similar result holds for case 6, where a = b = B. This attack is a simpler version of one discovered by Just and Vaudenay [9] and described by Boyd and Mathuria [3] . In the original attack, z was set to be r C − r A and the resulting session-key computed as g x A r C (where x A r C is realisable). The attack depends on the willingness of A to engage in the protocol with someone claiming her identity, and can be seen as stipulating a condition on an implementation: namely, that a principal should only engage in the protocol if the other party has a distinct identity. 
Consider the coefficient of x 0 C r 0 C . We have:
for some m 1 . . . m 5 ∈ Z, n 1 . . . n 5 ∈ Z where the coefficients on both sides are the same:
By assumption we have that variables are symbolic and that a given symbol x is distinct from all others. Specifically, we note that x B r A is distinct from all other terms on either side of the equation and, therefore, there are no values of the coefficients which enable the equality to be met. We conclude that, for any realisable z, k
Results
The analysis enables us to state the following result:
ab maintains secrecy This tells us that protocol A(0) maintains the secrecy of the session-key precisely when the initiator and responder are distinct entities and neither of them is the intruder C.
Discussion
The link with rank functions
Although we have not described our approach in such terms, it shares a conceptual origin with the notion of a rank function. In the context of protocol verification, a rank function describes an invariant property of a system [13] . This property will define the sorts of messages that may pass through the system, crucially distinguishing certain values that should remain secret. The rank function effectively partitions the message-space of a protocol by assigning a rank of pub to public and sec to secret messages. Traditionally a rank function is defined over the message-space of a protocol model expressed in the process algebra CSP [14] , and a central rank theorem gives a series of proof obligations on the rank function whose achievement allows us to conclude that only messages of rank pub ever appear on the network. Previous work has applied the rank function approach in the context of Diffie-Hellman protocols [6] . However, a fundamental difficulty with this approach is the necessity to statically assign a rank to messages. It is interesting to note that the present work side-steps this issue by defining (via the message-template) the set Pub of public messages. This set corresponds to the set of messages assigned a rank of pub by the rank approach. 1 
Pereira and Quisquater's approach
Recently, Pereira and Quisquater [12] developed a formal model of the Cliques conference key agreement protocols [2] , based on linear logic, and discovered attacks on each of the claimed security properties. In the model, secrecy is defined as the inability of an intruder to discover a pair of values (g x , g y ) such that, if a principal is sent g x , he will compute the key g y . Values are assumed to take the form of g raised to a product of exponents, and secrecy becomes the inability of an intruder to learn a pair of messages separated by the ratio y x . The model allows the intruder to grow a set of known ratios, in the hope that some secret ratio(s) remain unobtainable. This ratio-centric view of secrecy seems particularly natural for Diffie-Hellman exchanges, and our initial attempts at modelling the MTI protocols sought to embrace this approach. However, it turns out that this view of secrecy does not generalise in the obvious way. Consider, for example, a value z in the A(0) protocol, and the key computation function z -is still in terms of z, due to the presence of addition in the exponents. This fact makes it difficult to derive the set of secret ratios, since a ratio cannot be stated without recourse to the argument to the key computation function. The present work can be viewed as an attempt to provide a more general view of Diffie-Hellman key computation.
In a different respect, Pereira's and Quisquater's model is more general than ours, since it applies to protocols which fail to satisfy the property of I/Oindependence. This property, recall, tells us that no user of the protocol ever sends out any message which is dependent on a previously received message. In the Cliques protocols, protocol participants tend to receive a message, perform some computation on that message and send out the result. Pereira and Quisquater call such user operations services. 2 These services are encoded in terms of the values added to the exponent of an incoming message. For instance, a principal may receive a message g x and generate and send the message g xyz (where y and z are known to that principal). The intruder can then (with some restrictions) use the principal as an oracle, enabling him to send a spurious message g c and receive g cyz in return. The fact that the property of I/Oindependence does not allow such services to be expressed in our model is not a fundamental limitation but a restriction which enables us to describe our work in a clean manner. One could envisage weakening this assumption by internalising such services in the intruder (in the style of Broadfoot and Roscoe [5] ) where, for example, the multiplication of a value with yz is encoded as an additional intruder deduction. The message-template would need to be redesigned to account for these additional capabilities. In contrast to the present work, such a message-template would tend to be protocol specific.
Conclusion and further work
We have presented a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of DiffieHellman protocols, and demonstrated the approach by a consideration of secrecy in the MTI A(0) protocol. The work hinges around the idea of a messagetemplate, an object which defines, in a highly abstract way, the values that can be deduced by an intruder under a given set of capabilities. A protocol model is given as a combination of a message-template and a function representing the key computation applied by a principal to derive a shared secret.
This work is nascent, but we are currently applying it to other protocols, both within and without the MTI suite. This requires us to relax the condition of I/O-independence and widen our model to address situations in which protocol participants provide services. In many cases, this extension appears straightforward. The ad hoc nature of the secrecy proof in Section 4 is unfortunate, and it would be useful to derive a general framework for such proof (as is achieved in [12] , for instance). There also appears to be interesting links between the idea of a message-template and the concept of ideal used within the strand space approach [15] . Future work will investigate whether this correspondence enables us to deduce general principles with which a protocol can be proven correct.
